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To Catch a Lawsuit: Constitutional
Principles at Work in the
Investigative-Journalism Genre
ABSTRACT
This Note examines two causes of action, civil rights violations
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and IIED claims, in the context of lawsuits
against investigative journalists. Examining two recent cases in
particular, Tiwari v. NBC Universal, Inc. and Conradt v. NBC
Universal, Inc., which arise out of NBC's conduct in its primetime
series To Catch a Predator, this Note concludes that legal standards
governing conduct by investigative journalists are currently unclear.
Investigative journalists are not adequately on notice as to when they
might be liable under § 1983 for violating a subject's civil rights. And
district courts have failed to appreciate journalists' First Amendment
rights when analyzing IIED claims. Ultimately, this Note advocates
for a "media influence" test that analyzes whether a journalist should
be liable for civil rights violations under § 1983 and concludes that
courts must exclude journalists' ability to widely disseminate
information as a 'osition of power" when analyzing outrageousness
alleged in IIED claims.
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On October 25, 2011, a federal district court in the Northern
District of California permitted plaintiff Anurag Tiwari's lawsuit
against NBC Universal, Inc. (NBC) to proceed past summary
judgment.' Tiwari, who appeared as an alleged child predator on the
Dateline NBC (Dateline) primetime series, To Catch A Predator
(TCAP), asserted, inter alia, that NBC committed civil-rights
violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.2 Tiwari also asserted a state-law
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). 3 NBC was
in familiar territory,4 having been sued recently by the estate of
another "predator," Louis Conradt.5 Conradt, an assistant district
attorney in Texas, committed suicide as police sought entry into his
home while TCAP host Chris Hansen and the TCAP camera crew
waited outside.6
The Conradt and Tiwari lawsuits highlight questions that
investigative journalists face on a regular basis. When does a
journalist violate a subject's privacy rights guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment? When do First Amendment principles protect the
journalist's conduct? Currently, journalists operate without a clear
1. Tiwari v. NBC Universal, Inc., No. C-08-3988 EMC, 2011 WL 5079505 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 25, 2011). The parties have since settled all outstanding claims on private terms. See
Stipulation and Order for Voluntary Dismissal of Plaintiffs Claim for Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress, Tiwari v. NBC Universal, Inc., No. 03:08-CV-03988 EMC (N.D. Cal. Nov.
22, 2011) (08-cv-03988-EMC), ECF No. 117.
2. Tiwari, 2011 WL 5079505, at *1, *3. See also the federal statute establishing a civil
cause of action for deprivation of constitutional rights, which states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). The statute has two goals: deterring use of state authority to deny
constitutionally guaranteed rights and relief for any such violations. E.g., Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S.
158, 161 (1992).
3. Tiwari, 2011 WL 5079505, at *3.
4. See, e.g., Conradt v. NBC Universal, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 2d 380, 380 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
5. Id.; Brian Stelter, NBC Settles with Family that Blamed a TV Investigation for a
Man's Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/26/business/
media/26nbc.html.
6. Tim Eaton, Prosecutor Kills Himself in Texas Raid over Child Sex, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
7, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/07/us/07pedophile.html.
2012] 119
VANDERBILT J. OF ENT. AND TECH. LAW
understanding of either their own rights or those of their subjects.
This uncertainty has allowed tragic events to transpire, such as those
giving rise to Conradt.7 Indeed, investigative journalists have the
ability to deprive an individual of his privacy, to destroy his
reputation in the community, and to damage him psychologically. But
journalists also have a countervailing responsibility to disseminate
law enforcement information to the community. As investigative
journalism grows increasingly popular in the reality-television genre,
courts should establish clearer standards delineating when the
Constitution will protect journalists' conduct as they discover and
report crimes, and when journalists' conduct violates an individual's
constitutional rights.
This Note analyzes the First and Fourth Amendment rights at
stake in investigative journalism and advances a clearer framework
for courts to use while analyzing cases like Tiwari. Part I discusses
the recent surge of investigative journalism and the attendant
constitutional issues, using TCAP as a case study. Part II focuses on
two relevant causes of action arising out of aggressive investigative
journalism-§ 1983 claims based on Fourth Amendment violations
and IIED claims-and argues that the law is unclear as to when
journalists' conduct gives rise to either of these claims. Finally, Part
III advances a simple framework for courts to apply when deciding
First and Fourth Amendment issues, which will clarify the law and
thereby protect private individuals and journalists alike.
I. "WHY DON'T You HAVE A SEAT": THE RECENT SURGE IN
INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM
A. The Marriage of Entertainment and Law Enforcement
In 2004, Dateline, faced with deflated ratings, collaborated
with the Perverted Justice Foundation (PJF) to set up its first sting
operation in Bethpage, New York.8 Dateline's first show was premised
on dramatic confrontations between its host, Chris Hansen, and
various unwitting "sexual predators" who believed they were
rendezvousing with underage youths they met in online chat rooms.9
PJF provided the online decoys-adults posing as thirteen- to
fifteen-year-old youths-and Dateline provided the cameras, capturing
7. See infra Part II.A.2.
8. Amy Adler, To Catch a Predator, 21 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 532, 537 (2011).
9. Tiwari v. NBC Universal, Inc., No. C-08-3988 EMC, 2011 WL 5079505, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 25, 2011).
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each shocking confrontation.10 Eighteen men came to the decoy house
in less than three days." The segment aired under the title
Dangerous Web12 and was extremely popular.13 In response, Dateline
organized a series of additional "predator" investigations throughout
the country.14
Prior to the third investigation, which Dateline and PJF
conducted in Mira Loma, California, local law enforcement agents
contacted PJF and requested permission to conduct "parallel"
investigations of the "predators."15 PJF notified Dateline, and both
agreed to involve members of local law enforcement in the program.16
Police would wait until the end of Hansen's verbal reproach, then
arrest the "predator" as he left the scene.17 Dateline's cameramen
would capture the arrest on film, showing the "predator" falling into a
trap of overaggressive law enforcement personnel.18  These
confrontations became routine, and a compilation of the operation's
twelve investigations, which led to over 256 arrests, aired under the
title To Catch a Predator.19
The show was tremendously popular, netting an average of
seven million viewers for each of the eleven episodes that aired during
the 2006-2007 season.20 Some fans lauded the show for increasing
parental awareness and highlighting the online-predator issue for
policymakers; other fans stayed tuned for entertainment and even
10. Id.
11. Chris Hansen, Dangers Children Face Online, DATELINE NBC (Nov. 11, 2004, 11:19
AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.comlid/6083442.
12. Watch Dateline NBC Season 1 Episode 1 Bethpage, Long Island, OVGUIDE,
http://www.ovguide.com/tv-episode/dateline-nbc-season-1-episode-1-bethpage-long-island-14704
(last visited Oct. 24, 2012) ("The first in the series aired in November 2004 as a Dateline NBC
segment called Dangerous Web. The operation was set up in a home in Long Island, NY, to
which 18 men came over two-and-a-half days after making an appointment for sex with a minor.
One of the men in the investigation was a New York City firefighter, who was later fired by the
FDNY.").
13. The 26th Annual News and Documentary Emmy Award Nominees Announced Today
by the National Television Academy, NAT'L TELEVISION ACAD. (July 18, 2005), http://www.
emmyonline.org/releases/pdfl26thNewsNominationsReleaseFinalRevised(
7 .18.05).pdf (receiving
a vote in favor of a 2004-2005 News and Documentary Emmy nomination for "Outstanding
Investigative Journalism In a News Magazine").
14. See Stelter, supra note 5.
15. Luke Dittrich, Interview with Chris Hansen: The Transcript, ESQUIRE (Aug. 2, 2007,
2:00 PM), http://www.esquire.com/features/hansen -transcript.
16. See Sandra Stokley, 'To Catch a Predator' Sex Stings Net Mixed Results,
PRESS-ENTERPRISE, Sept. 28, 2007, available at http://www.willdefendu.com/Resources/Articles/
to-catch-a-predator-sex-stings-net-mixed-results.
17. Adler, supra note 8, at 539.
18. See id.
19. Stelter, supra note 5.
20. Id.
1212012]1
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comedic value.21 But despite its popularity, the show also received
severe criticism.22
Critics accused Dateline of violating journalism ethics and
standards by creating stories rather than following them.23 They
argued that Dateline sought and engaged in vigilante justice rather
than simply reporting the news.24 Other critics, particularly legal
experts, accused PJF of failing to keep adequate records of its online
conversations with predators and of entrapping alleged predators
without sufficient evidence.25 Additionally, many critics noted PJF's
conflict of interest, as NBC paid it consulting fees, which potentially
incentivized overzealous enforcement.26
TCAPs negative attention peaked on November 5, 2006, in
Murphy, Texas, when the TCAP crew surrounded the house of
suspected predator and assistant district attorney Louis Conradt.27
While local law enforcement agents sought entry into Mr. Conradt's
house to execute an arrest warrant, Mr. Conradt took his own life. 28
Mr. Conradt's sister, Patricia Conradt, sued NBC for $105 million on
behalf of Mr. Conradt's estate, alleging that Hansen illegally
persuaded Murphy police to seek a warrant to arrest Mr. Conradt at
21. See Marcus Baram, Turning the Tables on 'To Catch a Predator', ABC NEWS (June
5, 2007), http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=3235975&page=1 (discussing TCAPs peaking
criticism after the suicide); Fabolous Speaks on His Appreciation for MSNBC's To Catch a
Predator, XXL NEWS (Jan. 26, 2011, 4:26 PM), http://m.xxlmag.com/v/News/Fabolous
SpeaksOnHis (excerpting an interview with Brooklyn rapper Fabolous, where he discusses how
TCAP is "hilariously funny" to him); MADtv, To Catch a Predator, YOUTUBE (Nov. 15, 2007),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-oUcw7XIWISI (parodying TCAP and netting over one-million
hits); South Park: Le Petit Tourette (Comedy Central broadcast Oct. 3, 2007) (parodying an
episode of TCAP).
22. See, e.g., Baram, supra note 21 (discussing the lawsuit filed by Marsha Bartel, a
journalist who formerly worked for Dateline on TCAP and who alleged that she was fired after
complaining about ethical breaches).
23. See, e.g., David Anderson, To Entrap a Predator, COUNTERPUNCH (Feb. 7, 2008),
http://www.counterpunch.org/2008/02/07/nbc-s-quot-to-entrap-quot-a-predator. But see Stone
Phillips, Inside Dateline: Why It's Not Entrapment, DATELINE NBC (Feb. 1, 2006, 3:21 PM),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/I1131562/ns/datelinenbc/tlinside-dateline-why-its-not-
entrapment (arguing that PJF entices, but does not entrap, the predators).
24. See supra note 23.
25. See Associated Press, DA Refuses to Prosecute 'Catch a Predator' Cases, NBC NEWS
(June 28, 2007, 3:01 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.comlid/19486893/ns/us-news-crimeand
courts/t/da-refuses-prosecute-catch-predator-cases ("A for the rest of the cases, [the District
Attorney] said neither police nor NBC could guarantee the chat logs were authentic and
complete.").
26. See, e.g., Baram, supra note 21 (discussing former Dateline and TCAP journalist
Marsha Bartel's allegations that TCAP paid PJF, giving it "financial incentive to lie to trick
targets of its sting" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
27. Eaton, supra note 6; see Baram, supra note 21 (discussing criticism of TCAP after
the suicide).
28. Eaton, supra note 6.
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his home.29 Although the Conradt estate ultimately settled with
NBC, 3 0 the lawsuit shone a spotlight on the questionable influence
Dateline may have had over law enforcement personnel, as well as the
insidious impact that investigative journalism can have on the
integrity of the criminal-justice system.31
The negative press surrounding TCAP continued when police,
working with the program, allegedly used excessive force when
arresting a suspected predator named Anurag Tiwari.32
Subsequently, NBC cancelled TCAP.3 3 Mr. Tiwari sued NBC, and the
parties have since settled on private terms.3 4
Although NBC canceled TCAP, the program's aggressive brand
of investigative journalism has survived. For example, Dateline
subsequently aired shows such as: To Catch a Con Man, To Catch an
ID-Thief, To Catch a Car Thief, and To Catch an i-Jacker.35 Similarly,
A&E's "truTV," formerly "Court TV," currently airs law enforcement
programs such as: The First 48, which covers the early stages of
homicide investigations; Beyond Scared Straight, which captures
juvenile interventions; and The Peacemaker: L.A. Gang Wars, which
follows a negotiator who seeks peace between Los Angeles gangs.36
While these networks have undoubtedly taken note of Dateline's
missteps, each new program is relatively blind to governing legal
standards and is therefore bound to encounter claims of liability. 37
29. See Conradt v. NBC Universal, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 2d 380, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 2008);
Stelter, supra note 5.
30. Stelter, supra note 5.
31. See Conradt, 536 F. Supp. 2d at 383.
32. Tiwari v. NBC Universal, Inc., No. C-08-3988 EMC, 2011 WL 5079505, at *2 (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 25, 2011).
33. See Steve Rendall, The Online Predator Scare, FAIRNESS & ACCURACY IN
REPORTING, http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=3752 (last visited Aug. 30, 2012). Mr. Tiwari
has subsequently settled his IJED claim with NBC. See Stipulation and Order for Voluntary
Dismissal of Plaintiffs Claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, Tiwari v. NBC
Universal, Inc., No. 03:08-CV-03988 EMC (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2011) (08-cv-03988-EMC), ECF
No. 117.
34. Case Management Scheduling Order, Docket, Tiwari v. NBC Universal, Inc., No.
3:C-08-3988 EMC, (N.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2012), ECF No. 121.
35. Kim Zetter, NBC Dateline's "Catch a Predator" Series Pays Cops and Undercover
"Victims" - Updated, WIRED (Aug. 8, 2007, 4:42 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2007/08/
nbc-datelines-c.
36. Jon Caramanica, Squad Cars, Sirens and Gangs, and the Cameras that Love Them,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2011, http://tv.nytimes.com/2011/01/17/arts/television/17crime.html. The
genre has even spread to Europe. See Scott Roxborough, Scandal Surrounds German 'To Catch a
Predator' Show, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Oct. 18, 2010, 7:14 AM), http://www.
hollywoodreporter.com/news/scandal-surrounds-german-catch-predator-31007 (discussing
disappearance of suspect who appeared on the German analog of TCAP).
37. See, e.g., Caramanica, supra note 36; see also Patterson v. NBC Universal, Inc., No.
1:11CV-P68-R, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81701, at *5-6 (W.D. Ky. July 26, 2011) (claiming
intentional infliction of emotional distress by NBC for conduct in TCAP); Armstrong v. NBC
2012] 123
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B. Investigative Journalists'Role in Society
1. Important Duty to Disseminate Information
While it is undesirable for journalists to violate individuals'
rights, it is also undesirable for journalists to be uncertain of their
own rights, as uncertainty may chill investigative reporting.
Investigative journalists traditionally have served the important
function of informing the public, often by exposing injustices.38
Investigative journalist Robert Parry, perhaps best known for his
work in exposing Oliver North's role in the Iran-Contra Affair, 39
declared: "Investigative reporting is to journalism what theoretical
research is to science[. It has] the potential to present new realities
and shatter old paradigms-how people see and understand the world
around them-which, in turn, can transform politics."4 0 Journalists
are uniquely situated to inform the public about important matters
that often escape the public eye.41  And, as Parry averred,
investigative journalists have undoubtedly played an important role
throughout history in alerting policymakers to problems that need
attention.42
Dateline's TCAP, for example, informed the public about the
online-predator issue in myriad ways.43 First, TCAP raised parental
awareness.44 Middle-aged adults represent the greatest portion of the
primetime viewing public, and parents of young children undoubtedly
constituted a significant portion of the 9.1 million average viewers.45
Universal, Inc., No. 1:11CV-P67-M, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60119, at *5 (W.D. Ky. June 6, 2011)
(claiming intentional infliction of emotional distress by NBC for conduct in TCAP); Complaint,
Jones v. A&E Television Network, No. 2:10-cv-14942-RHC-RSW (E.D. Mich. Dec. 14, 2010), ECF
No. 1 (alleging § 1983 violation stemming from the accidental shooting death of seven-year-old by
a police officer while police were searching for a murder suspect during the filming of A&E's
reality crime-drama The First 48).
38. Robert Parry, Why We Need Investigative Reporting, CONSORTIUMNEWS.COM (July
29, 2005), http://www.consortiumnews.com/2005/072905.html.
39. See Robert Parry, ALTERNATIVE RADIO, http://www.alternativeradio.org/collections/
spkrobert-parry (last visited Oct. 18, 2012).
40. Parry, supra note 38.
41. See id. (describing a number of scandals broken by investigative journalists in the
1970s and 1980s, and contrasting them with the reporting of "conventional wisdom" in the 1990s
and 2000s).
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., MSNBC, To Catch a Predator with Chris Hansen, NBC NEWS,
http://www.msnbc.msn.comlid/10912603/ns/dateline-nbc-to_catch-a_predator (last visited Sept.
4, 2012) (providing links to resources and articles addressing the risk of online predators).
44. See id.
45. See Allen Salkin, Web Site Hunts Pedophiles, and TV Goes Along, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
13, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/13/technology/13justice.html ("Ratings for the
'Dateline' broadcasts, a series called 'To Catch a Predator' that has become a network franchise,
[Vol. 15:1:117124
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Second, Dateline created an informative website for parents.46 The
website has numerous links to educational materials, including a
video interview with Robert De Leo of the Polly Klaas Foundation47 -a
foundation devoted to abduction prevention and recovery of missing
children-that provides tips for parents.48 It also includes links to
webpages with specific content: "Warnings signs of kids' online risky
behavior," "For parents: tips for kids of different ages," and "Experts
answer frequently asked questions."49 Thus, the website promotes
additional learning and may help prevent online predation.50 Through
its television show and website, TCAP provided a service to the
community by informing the public and members of law enforcement
about a societal problem.5 '
2. Entertainment as Information: Issue Distortion
Although Dateline performs a public service by informing
viewers about an important issue, its simultaneous role as an
entertainment platform renders its journalists susceptible to
committing abuses.52 Issue distortion is one negative byproduct of
programs operating at the intersection of journalism and
have averaged 9.1 million viewers, compared with 7 million viewers for other 'Dateline' episodes,
according to Nielsen Media Research."). Commentators have noted that parental awareness can
be key to solving the online-predator problem. See, e.g., Alice S. Fisher, Sexual Exploitation Over
the Internet: What Parents, Kids and Congress Need to Know About Child Predators, DEP.
JUSTICE (May 3, 2006), http://www.justice.gov/criminalceos/CT/downloads/AAG%20
Testimony%205032006.pdf ("[A] key to preventing this victimization of children is educating the
public. The American people need to appreciate the scope, the nature, and the impact of this
problem on our youth.").
46. See MSNBC, supra note 43.
47. See id.; Staying Ahead of 'Predators, NBC NEWS (Oct. 6, 2006, 3:45 PM),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15157979/ns/dateline-nbc/#.TrbBLGbgJA (providing article and
video interview with Robert De Leo).
48. See About Us, POLLY KLAAS FOUND., http://www.pollyklaas.org/about (last visited
Feb. 24, 2012).
49. See MSNBC, supra note 43 and accompanying text. Hansen has published a book to
further instruct parents about prevention. CHRIS HANSEN, To CATCH A PREDATOR: PROTECTING
YOUR KIDS FROM ONLINE ENEMIES ALREADY IN YOUR HOME (2007). The PJF similarly uses its
website to educate parents, providing very long and explicit chat logs of conversations between
its decoys and suspected online predators. See PERVERTED JUSTICE FOUND.,
http://www.perverted-justice.com (last visited Sept. 4, 2012) (also providing an updated
"conviction counter" listing the number of convictions secured with the help of PJF since PJF
began operating in 2004).
50. See MSNBC, supra note 43; Potential predators go south in Kentucky, MSNBC.coM,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10912603 (last visited Aug. 6, 2012).
51. See MSNBC, supra note 43.
52. See Conradt v. NBC Universal, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 2d 380, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). As
suggested by the trial court in Conradt, representatives of the media, such as Dateline, have a
significant power-the power to disseminate-which is attended by the responsibility to inform
the public. Id.
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entertainment; sensational broadcasting can overstate the prevalence
or intensity of an issue, causing a disproportionate reaction from the
public and policymakers.53
Entertainment reporters straddle two duties that are in
tension with each other. On the one hand, journalists have a
responsibility to report events with factual accuracy.54 On the other
hand, primetime television programs must attract and entertain
viewers to ensure vitality, which can encourage exaggeration and
sensationalism.55 As Carl Bernstein, of the Bernstein-Woodward duo
that unearthed the Watergate scandal,56 lamented, "The conflict
between the bottom line of truth and profit . . . has become a terrible
conflict, and the bottom line is winning .... Increasingly,
sensationalism, gossip, [and] manufactured controversy have become
our agenda instead of the best obtainable version of the truth."57
Because Dateline is a news program, viewers, including policymakers,
may improperly assume its reports are objective. Sensational
reporting can lead to policymaking that is incommensurate with the
severity of a reported issue and can misinform the public.5 8
a. Problematic Influence over Policymakers
When a news organization reports in a sensational manner,
perhaps to increase ratings during primetime, it can distort issues at
the highest levels of government.59  For example, in his speech
announcing the DOJ's new Project Safe Childhood initiative, Attorney
General Alberto Gonzales stated, "[i]t has been estimated that, at any
given time, 50,000 predators are on the Internet prowling for
children," and referred to the problem as an "epidemic."60 Gonzales's
53. See infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
54. See, e.g., SPJ Code of Ethics, SOC'Y PROF'L JOURNALISTS, available at http://www.
spj.org/ethicscode.asp (last visited Aug. 30, 2012) [hereinafter SPJ Code of Ethics] ("Journalists
should . . . [t]est the accuracy of information from all sources and exercise care to avoid
inadvertent error.... [And] [n]ever distort the content of news photos or video.").
55. See, e.g., Interviews-Carl Bernstein, FRONTLINE (Feb. 13, 2007), http://www.pbs.
org/wgbhpages/frontline/newswar/interviews/bernstein.html.
56. See The Watergate Story: The Post Investigates, WASH. POST, http://www.washington
post.com/wp-srv/politics/speciallwatergate/partl.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2012).
57. See supra note 55; see also RAJMOHAN JOSHI, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JOURNALISM AND
MASS COMMUNICATION 256 (Gyan Publishing House 2006) (noting that sensationalism is a
common contemporary ethical complaint).
58. See infra notes 60-62.
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source for this statistic was TCAP.61 But as Columbia Journalism
Review contributor Douglas McCollom pointed out in his article, The
Shame Game, Dateline's source for the statistic was a retired FBI
agent it hired as a consultant.62 When Legal Times reporter Jason
McLure asked the consultant about the statistic, he answered that it
was a "Goldilocks" figure-"not small and not large."6 3 Dateline has
since stated that solid statistics are difficult to find but that the
problem seems to be getting worse.64
While the onus to consider empirical research rests with
policymakers, journalists also have an ethical obligation to seek
reliable sources and report the facts.65 Indeed, even if officials can be
trusted to rely on empirical information, programs like TCAP have the
ability to influence policymakers indirectly by causing concern and
panic among an official's constituency, spurring a legislative
response.66 For example, as Professor Adler points out in her article,
To Catch a Predator, TCAP influenced Congress by precipitating the
passage of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006.67
Sponsoring Senator Bill Frist acknowledged that the issue "didn't
really hit, to be honest, until I saw To Catch a Predator... [A]I1 of a
sudden I started seeing these faces themselves, and I started relating
it back to the fact that I'm a parent, and I've got three children.
They've come up in this Internet age."6 8 In fact, Senator Frist thanked
host Hansen, and Senator Orrin Hatch thanked PJF for "directly
impacting" passage of the Act.6 9
61. Ben Radford, Predator Panic: A Closer Look, THE COMMITTEE FOR SKEPTICAL
INQUIRY (Sept.-Oct. 2006), http://www.csicop.org/silshow/predator-panic a-closerlook.
62. See Adler, supra note 8, at 546 (citing Douglas McCollam, The Shame Game,
COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. Jan.-Feb. 2007, at 28).
63. See Andy Carvin, Online Predators: Much Ado About . . . What Exactly?, PBS
TEACHERSLEARNING.NOW (May 23, 2006, 11:31 AM), http://www.pbs.org/teachers/learning.now/
2006/05/online-predators-muchado abou.html.
64. See Adler, supra note 8, at 546 (citing Douglas McCollam, The Shame Game,
COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. Jan.-Feb. 2007, at 28).
65. See SPJ Code of Ethics, supra note 54 ("The duty of the journalist is to further those
ends by seeking truth and providing a fair and comprehensive account of events and issues.").
66. See Radford, supra note 61 and accompanying text.
67. See Adler, supra note 8, at 544-45.
68. Id. (quoting 152 CONG. REC. S4089 (daily ed. May 4, 2006) (statement of Sen. Frist)).
Incidentally, not everyone responds with such fear. In United States v. Courtright, 632 F.3d 363
(7th Cir. 2011), the defendant indicated that he had not considered sex with a minor until seeing
TCAP. Id. at 366. Surely, this is an especially rare reaction; however, it illustrates that viewers
often react in unique and significant ways to such extreme reality television. See id.
69. See Adler, supra note 8, at 545.
1272012]
VANDERBILT J. OF ENT. AND TECH. LAW
b. Influence of Sensational Reporting on Viewers Generally
Investigative-journalism programs, such as TCAP, strongly
influence viewers, as their sensationalist style makes them more
memorable, as compared to more objectively reported stories.70
Consider TCAP through the prism of Dr. John Newhagen of the Philip
Merrill College of Journalism's "approach-avoidance metaphor."71
According to Professor Newhagen, an emotional response to television
images is linked to memory of those images.72 Newhagen identifies
anger as the strongest negative response, and one that is "usually the
result of a territorial violation."" Thus, if a viewer feels a territorial
violation when viewing TCAP, she will have a greater propensity for
anger and therefore a marginally greater memory of the episode.74
The emotional response to a sensationalized event can raise a
viewer's awareness of the risk that she may experience the event.75 In
his 1993 book, Responding to Community Outrage: Strategies for
Effective Risk Communication, risk-communication specialist
Dr. Peter Sandman argues that risk is a function of hazard and
outrage.76 Although experts assess risk by multiplying the magnitude
of the event by the probability of the event occurring, often using data,
Sandman argues that the public assesses risk by considering the
probability of the event occurring-which Sandman refers to as the
"hazard"-and the sense of outrage, adding an emotional-response
component to risk assessment.77 As a result, a program investigating
a potential sexual predator can cause a viewer to apprehend a greater
70. See infra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
71. See John E. Newhagen, TV News Images that Induce Anger, Fear, and Disgust:
Effects on Approach-Avoidance and Memory, 42 J. of BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 265 (1998).
72. Id. The "approach-avoidance metaphor" focuses on how emotional responses play an




75. See BETTY H. MORROW, RISK BEHAVIOR AND RISK COMMUNICATION: SYNTHESIS AND
EXPERT INTERVIEWS 12 (2009), available at http://www.csc.noaa.gov/digitalcoast//pdf/risk-
behavior-communication-report.pdf ("Some types of risk cause moral outrage beyond that
expected by their incidence-such as child molestation."); see also Bruce Schneier, Drawing the
Wrong Lessons from Horrific Events, CNN (July 31, 2012, 10:57 AM), http://edition.
cnn.com/2012/07/31/opinion/schneier-aurora-aftermath/index.html ("Horrific events, such as the
massacre in Aurora, can be catalysts for social and political change. . . . People tend to base risk
analysis more on stories than on data. Stories engage us at a much more visceral level, especially
stories that are vivid, exciting or personally involving.").
76. PETER M. SANDMAN, RESPONDING TO COMMUNITY OUTRAGE: STRATEGIES FOR
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risk than objective statistics would indicate.78 Much like publication
of an incorrect statistic,79 increased risk perception can cause a
disproportionate response by the viewing public.80
C. Journalists as Poor Self-Regulators: The Need for Courts to
Establish Clearer Legal Standards
Journalists' codes of ethics do little to protect individual
suspects.8' These codes, published by various professional journalism
organizations, typically embody principles of objectivity, harm
limitation, accuracy, and timely distribution of information in the
public interest.82 They provide guidance to journalists and news
organizations, and they are often formulated or based upon past
problems and incidents.83 These codes are merely advisory, which is
problematic for two reasons. First, different journalists and news
organizations are free to operate under differing value systems
depending on their objectives.84 For instance, a public radio station's
values will diverge from a tabloid's values.8 5 These divergences are
meaningful in the investigative journalism genre.86
Second, the codes provide little protection to individuals
because they are not enforceable.7 Unlike a bar association, which
can disbar a member lawyer and exclude him from the practice of law,
78. See id. at 8.
79. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
81. See Fred Brown, Using the SPJ Code, Soc'Y PROF. JOURNALISTS, http://www.
spj.org/ethics-papers-code.asp (last visited Sept. 4, 2012) ("The code is entirely voluntary. It is
not a legal document; it has no enforcement provisions or penalties for violations, and SPJ
strongly discourages anyone from attempting to use it that way.").
82. See JOSHI, supra note 57, at 251-56.
83. See id. at 251.
84. See Code of Conduct, NAT'L UNION JOURNALISTS (Sept. 28, 2011), http://www.
nuj.org.uk/innerPagenuj.html?docid=174; Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct, RADIO
TELEVISION DIGITAL NEWS ASS'N, http://www.rtnda.org/pages/media items/code-of-ethics-and-
professional-conduct48.php (last visited Aug. 8, 2012); SPJ Code of Ethics, supra note 54; supra
note 81 and accompanying text.
85. See Joshi writing on differing values in reporting, stating:
Laws with regard to personal privacy, official secrets, and media disclosure of names
and facts from criminal cases and civil lawsuits differ widely, and journalistic
standards may vary accordingly. Different organizations may have different answers
to questions about when it is journalistically acceptable to skirt, circumvent, or even
break these regulations.
JOSHI, supra note 57, at 259. Disagreement between journalists in the face of a profitable story
can be seen in the lawsuit of Marsha Bartel, who alleged she was fired from Dateline after
objecting to what she saw as unethical journalism. See Bartel v. NBC Universal, Inc., 543 F.3d
901, 902 (7th Cir. 2008).
86. See JOSHI, supra note 57, at 259.
87. See infra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
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there is no enforcing body in the journalism community that mandates
compliance with an ethical code.88 An individual harmed when a
journalist fails to act ethically has little recourse: he must either
boycott the publication, which is unlikely to influence the journalist's
behavior, or resort to legal action.
Although the relevant legal standards are unclear, tort law has
the greatest potential to deter overstepping journalists.89 The public
will rarely punish journalists for violating an individual's rights,
especially if that individual is unpopular, which is common in an
investigative program like TCAP. Without fear of public backlash for
violating the rights of an individual, the investigative journalist can
deal with an individual suspect nearly uninhibitedly so long as the
journalist has not broken any laws-unless the journalist incurs civil
liability for the conduct.90 Tort law should protect individuals when a
journalist violates their rights. The problem is that current legal
standards, such as when an investigative journalist has violated a
suspect's Fourth Amendment rights, or committed an IIED tort,
remain unclear.91
II. THE LACK OF CLARITY IN CURRENT LEGAL STANDARDS GUIDING
INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS
Journalists operate freely in the United States, compared to
other countries, especially when reporting about the government,92 but
88. See infra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
89. The accidental shooting of Stanley-Jones by police in A&E's The First 48 evinces a
rare exception where a public outcry results. See Caramanica, supra note 36. Police raided the
home of Stanley-Jones in May 2010 in search of a murder suspect and killed Stanley-Jones
accidentally. See Gina Damron, Trial Set for Detroit Police Officer, TV Photographer in Aiyana
Stanley-Jones' Death, DET. FREE PRESS, Oct. 28, 2011, http://www.freep.com/article/20111028/
NEWS01/111028049/Trial-set-Detroit-police-officer-TV-photographer-Aiyana-Stanley-Jones-
death.
90. See, e.g., Tiwari v. NBC Universal, Inc., No. C-08-3988, 2011 WL 5079505, at *3
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2011) (alleging § 1983 violation and IED claims against NBC for conduct in
TCAP); Patterson v. NBC Universal, Inc., No. 1:11CV-P68-R, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81701, at *4
(W.D. Ky. July 26, 2011) (alleging IIED claim against NBC for conduct in TCAP); Armstrong v.
NBC Universal, Inc., No. 1:11CV-P67-M, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60119, at *5 (W.D. Ky. Jun. 6,
2011) (stating IIED claim against NBC for conduct in TCAP); Conradt v. NBC Universal, Inc.,
536 F. Supp. 2d 380, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (alleging § 1983 violation and IIED claims against NBC
for conduct in TCAP); Complaint at 6-9, Jones v. A&E Television Network, No. 2:10-cv-14942-
RHC-RSW (E.D. Mich. Dec. 14, 2010) (alleging § 1983 violation stemming from the May 2010
accidental shooting death of seven-year old Aiyana Stanley-Jones by a Detroit police officer while
police were searching for a murder suspect during the filming of A&E's reality crime-drama, The
First 48).
91. See, e.g., Tiwari, 2011 WL 5079505, at *10; Conradt, 536 F. Supp. 2d at 396.
92. The journalistic experience elsewhere in the world differs greatly:
Cambodia, meanwhile, continues to struggle with traditional media rights. ... Twelve
journalists were killed in Cambodia between 1995 and 2008, but no perpetrators have
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courts bear the responsibility of protecting individual rights. Courts
must establish workable standards that put journalists on notice
before they unknowingly violate an individual's rights. As Professor
Alan Dershowitz suggests, the relationship between the media's rights
and the individual's rights is not zero-sum.9 3 Dershowitz describes the
media's attainment of rights as a "one-way ratchet" rather than a
"two-way pendulum."94 Courts can jettison this stigma by fairly
balancing the important interests at stake between the public's need
to obtain information and the individual's constitutional right to
privacy vouchsafed by the Fourth Amendment.95
Two instances where courts currently have the opportunity to
establish clearer standards of liability are in § 1983 claims and IIED
claims against journalists. These two causes of action are discussed
below in the context of Dateline's role in Tiwari and Conradt.96
A. Unreasonable Media Intrusions into an Individual's Privacy
When a journalist investigates a suspect, the suspect may have
grounds to claim that the journalist violated his Fourth Amendment
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures and seek
recourse under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.97 This section explains the basic
elements of a § 1983 claim and argues that the proper application of
been arrested in any of those cases. .. . Critics of the new penal code say defamation
and disinformation should be civil suits, not criminal, and should not carry jail
penalties. Such charges have been used in recent years to try and jail journalists who
have written unflatteringly of public officials or powerful business interests.
Sok Khemara, Fear Among Journalists Hindering Freedom, VOICE OF AM. (Apr. 25, 2011, 7:00
AM), http://www.voanews.com/khmer-english/news/Fear-Among-Journalists-Hindering-Freedom
-Analysts-120605319.html; see JOSHI, supra note 57, at 258 ("Very often non-free media are
prohibited from criticizing the national government, and in many cases are required to distribute
propaganda as if it were news.").
93. See noted constitutional law scholar Alan Dershowitz's statement on media rights:
The situation with the media is quite different. They do have the power to
preserve-indeed, to expand-rights once those rights are given to them. An apt
metaphor for media rights is the one-way ratchet, not the two-way pendulum. The
media use these rights to enhance their power. They can use their right of expression
to persuade the general public that it is in the interest of that public to preserve,
indeed enhance, the freedom of the press-that media rights are not a zero-sum game,
but rather a win-win situation. It is far more difficult, therefore, to take away or
diminish a right once it is given to the media.
ALAN DERSHOWITZ, FINDING JEFFERSON: A LOST LETTER, A REMARKABLE DISCOVERY, AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM 104 (1st ed. 2007).
94. Id.
95. Conradt, 536 F. Supp. 2d at 389 (quoting United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112,
118-19 (2001)).
96. Amy Gajda, Judging Journalism: The Turn Toward Privacy and Judicial
Regulation of the Press, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1039, 1068 (2009).
97. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
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these elements to a journalist's investigation of a suspect is currently
unclear, rendering the question of liability unclear as well.
1. Basics of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim
a. Elements
Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1983 during Reconstruction in
conjunction with § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.98 A plaintiff may
seek relief in federal court under § 1983 if the plaintiff can prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that a person violated the plaintiffs
federally protected rights under color of state law.99 The plaintiff
must satisfy four elements: "(1) a violation of rights protected by the
federal Constitution or created by federal statute or regulation, (2)
proximately caused (3) by the conduct of a 'person' (4) who acted under
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom[,J or usage, of any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia."100
b. The Constitutional Right: Protection from Unreasonable Searches
and Seizures
In the investigative-journalism context, the federal right
allegedly violated is the constitutional protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment.101 Generally, when police are executing a warrant, the
search or seizure must be within the scope of the warrant to be
reasonable; the execution is unreasonable if it "exceeds that permitted
by the terms of [the] validly issued warrant or the character of the
relevant exception from the warrant requirement."102 Additionally,
98. MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 CLAIMS AND DEFENSES § 1.01 (2d ed. 2012).
99. Id.; see Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 638 (1980); Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 908
(7th Cir. 2005); Jenkins v. Medford, 119 F.3d 1156, 1159-60 (4th Cir. 1998); Eagleston v. Guido,
41 F.3d 865, 872 (2d Cir. 1994).
100. See, e.g., Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995, 1000-01 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting
SCHWARTZ, supra note 98, § 1.4 (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Fifth Circuit adds the
element that the acts proximately caused the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. See FIFTH
CIRCUIT PATTERN CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTION § 10.1 (2006).
101. The amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend IV.
102. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 611 (1999) (quoting Horton v. California, 496
U.S. 128, 140 (1990)).
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the execution must further the objectives of the warrant.03 A plaintiff
can sue members of the media if they are involved in a search or
seizure executed by or with law enforcement personnel, so long as the
media's conduct is "under color of law," discussed in the next
section. 104 But, unlike law enforcement personnel, who may be
entitled to qualified immunity from suits for unreasonable searches
and seizures, journalists enjoy no such entitlement, even when law
enforcement personnel sanction their conduct.105
c. "Under Color of Law" in the Investigative-Journalism Context
Courts typically decide the fourth element of the federal claim,
the "under color of law" element, as a matter of law when the
defendant is a state official; 06 however, when the defendant is a
private actor, such as a journalist, the court engages in a fact-specific
inquiry to determine whether she satisfies the requirement.107 Courts
103. Id. (citing Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment
does require that police actions in execution of a warrant be related to the objectives of the
authorized intrusion.").
104. See, e.g., Conradt v. NBC Universal, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 2d 380, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006)).
105. See Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158 (1992), which states, "Qualified immunity strikes a
balance between compensating those who have been injured by official conduct and protecting
government's ability to perform its traditional functions. . . . In short, the qualified immunity ...
acts to safeguard government, and thereby to protect the public at large, not to benefit its
agents." Id. at 167-68. The Court held that private defendants were not entitled to qualified
immunity in connection with a § 1983 suit for invoking a state replevin, garnishment, or
attachment statute. Id. at 168-69. In Conradt, the court noted that the media defendants are not
entitled to qualified immunity. See Conradt, 536 F. Supp. 2d at 391 (citing Wilson, 526 U.S. at
617-18).
106. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 212 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[A]
public official acting by virtue of his official capacity always acts under color of a state statute or
other law, whether or not he overtly relies on that authority to support his action, and whether
or not that action violates state law."); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 111 (1945) ("Acts of
officers who undertake to perform their official duties are included [within the reach of the
phrase 'under color of state law'] whether they hew to the line of their authority or overstep it.").
107. The Court states its fact-finding inquiry as:
Our cases have identified a host of facts that can bear on the fairness of such an
attribution. We have, for example, held that a challenged activity may be state action
when it results from the State's exercise of "coercive power," when the State provides
"significant encouragement, either overt or covert," or when a private actor operates
as a "willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents[.]" We have
treated a nominally private entity as a state actor when it is controlled by an "agency
of the State," when it has been delegated a public function by the State, when it is
"entwined with governmental policies," or when government is "entwined in [its]
management or control[.]"
Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 296 (2002) (alteration in
original) (citations omitted). The Second Circuit remarked, "whether conduct of a fundamentally
private institution . . . constitutes 'state action,' [is] one of the more slippery and troublesome
areas of civil rights litigation." Int'l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Air Canada, 727 F.2d
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have applied a number of tests to determine if a private actor acts
under color of law.108  In the context of TCAP and other live
investigations by journalists in concert with law enforcement, the
"joint-participation doctrine" is probably the most appropriate test.109
According to this doctrine, a private actor acts under color of law when
that actor conspires with state officials to deprive another of federal
rights.110 Thus, if members of the media conspire with police to
commit a search or seizure pursuant to a warrant, those members of
the media have probably acted under color of law.1 '
2. Three Principles that Govern Whether an Investigative Journalist
Has Violated a Suspect's Fourth Amendment Right to Privacy
This subsection extrapolates from important
investigative-journalism cases three crucial principles of Fourth
Amendment law regarding when a journalist has violated a suspect's
Fourth Amendment rights. Part III.A synthesizes these principles
into a workable Fourth Amendment test that should help courts
determine when an investigative journalist has violated a suspect's
Fourth Amendment rights.
253, 255 (2d Cir. 1984) (alteration in original) (quoting Graseck v. Mauceri, 582 F.2d 203, 204 (2d
Cir. 1978) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
108. See, e.g., Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 298 (applying a "pervasive entwinement"
test); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 624 (1991) (stating a public-function test
which examines whether the private actor is engaged in a "traditional function of government");
Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974) (enunciating the "close nexus" test, where
"the inquiry must be whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the
challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as
that of the State itself"); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 724 (1961)
(establishing the "symbiotic relationship" test later named in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407
U.S. 163, 175 (1972), that examines whether there is an "interdependent" relationship between
the state and the private actor); see also SCHWARTZ, supra note 98 §§ 5.10-5.17.
109. See Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 920 (1984) (citing Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24,
27-28 (1980)); see also the Court outlining the "fair attribution as:
First, the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created
by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the state or by a person for whom the
State is responsible. . . . Second, the party charged with the deprivation must be a
person who may fairly be said to be a state actor. This may be because he is a state
official, because he has acted together with or has obtained significant aid from state
officials, or because his conduct is otherwise chargeable to the State.
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
110. See Tower, 467 U.S. at 920.
111. Id.
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a. Principle 1: Whether the media's conduct is within the scope of the
warrant may determine the constitutionality of the media's conduct
during a search or seizure
Conradt is informative of the difficulties courts face when
trying to apply Fourth Amendment principles to a journalist's conduct.
Based on the court's discussion of warrants in Conradt, warrants may
determine the reasonableness of a journalist's conduct during a search
or seizure, and, if the warrant contemplates such conduct, it may
cleanse that conduct of Fourth Amendment violations.112
In Conradt, the US District Court for the Southern District of
New York stated that the plaintiff would need to prove that NBC,
under color of law, committed an unreasonable search or seizure, and
did so in a fashion that exceeded the terms of the warrant, not
including actions that are related to the objectives of the authorized
intrusion.113 The court denied NBC's motion to dismiss, finding that if
the plaintiff can prove the allegations contained in the Complaint, a
reasonable jury could find NBC liable.114 The court stated:
[A] reasonable jury could find that NBC crossed the line from responsible journalism to
irresponsible and reckless intrusion into law enforcement. Rather than merely report
on law enforcement's efforts to combat crime, NBC purportedly instigated and then
placed itself squarely in the middle of a police operation, pushing the police to engage in
tactics that were unnecessary and unwise, solely to generate more dramatic footage for
a television show.
115
The court struck at the heart of the sensational-journalism
controversy.116 Normatively, journalists cover stories, not create them.
The Conradt investigation began when Mr. Conradt
communicated with one of PJF's online decoys who posed as a
thirteen-year-old boy in Murphy, TX, in November 2006.117 Dateline
had hoped to include Mr. Conradt in the show, as he was both an
assistant district attorney and the "chief felony prosecutor" for a
neighboring county; however, Mr. Conradt decided not to travel to the
sting house.118 Undeterred, on November 5, 2006, Hansen, the host of
TCAP, allegedly requested that police accompany him to Conradt's
home.119 Hansen declared: "if he won't come to us, we'll go to him."120
112. See infra notes 124-30 and accompanying text.
113. See Conradt v. NBC Universal, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 2d 380, 389-91 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
114. Id. at 383.
115. Id.
116. See id.
117. Id. at 385.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See Complaint at 8, Conradt v. NBC Universal, Inc., No. 1:07-cv-06623-DC
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2007) [hereinafter Conradt Complaint].
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A detective acquiesced and acquired a warrant for the search of
Mr. Conradt's home and for Mr. Conradt's arrest.121 The judge who
issued the warrant was apparently unaware of Dateline's plan to
involve itself in the execution of the warrant, later claiming that he
would not have issued the warrant if he had been aware.122 This claim
of ignorance is supported by the November 5 warrant application,
which makes no mention of Dateline.123
The Conradt case raises the question of when a warrant must
contemplate media involvement. The court suggested that the
warrant itself might have been void because the judge was not
"apprised" of Dateline's involvement.124 But the court also posited that
it would not be fair to hold the media accountable for police actions in
withholding material information from the judge issuing the warrant,
since the media was not privy to the application.125 But this may not
matter; Dateline's intrusion was outside the scope of the warrant, and
thus its conduct, if it was a search or seizure, was likely
unreasonable.12 6 Unfortunately, the Conradt court added little clarity
to the Fourth Amendment reasonableness question, as the court did
not go so far as to indicate how and when Dateline "intrulded] into law
enforcement."12 7
But the court's observation about the legitimacy of the warrant
suggests that if a law enforcement agent who applies for a warrant
informs the judge of the media's anticipated role, the warrant may
cleanse the media's participation. In considering such information,
the judge will likely approve the warrant only if the media's conduct
strictly serves the narrow governmental interest of public
dissemination of information. In that event, the warrant will protect
members of the media from § 1983 claims after the search, so long as
the warrant contemplates media involvement.128
121. See Conradt, 536 F. Supp. 2d at 386.
122. Id. at 386 (citing Conradt Complaint, supra note 120, 11 31-32).
123. Affidavit of Peace Officer for Evidentiary Search Warrant, Conradt v. NBC
Universal, Inc., No. 1:07-cv-06623-DC (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2007), ECF No. 19.
124. See Conradt, 536 F. Supp. 2d at 391-92 (citing Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 606
(1999); Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505, 510-12 (9th Cir. 1997); Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680,
685 (2d Cir. 1994)).
125. See Conradt, 536 F. Supp. 2d at 391-92.
126. See id.
127. Id. at 383.
128. See id. at 391-92 (citing Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 606 (1999); Berger v.
Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505, 510-12 (9th Cir. 1997); Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680, 685 (2d Cir. 1994)).
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b. Principle 2: Searches that promote only media interests are
inherently unreasonable
Given that the media's goals and interests are often distinct
from law enforcement interests, if members of the media participate in
the execution of a warrant, they increase the probability that they will
violate the suspect's rights.129 The Conradt court relied on two 1999
Supreme Court cases that analyze media participation in the Fourth
Amendment context to support this point: Wilson v. Layne and Hanlon
v. Berger.130 In those cases, the Court recognized that the media can
serve a governmental interest, but this interest must be weighed
against the suspect's privacy interests.131
Wilson and Hanlon differentiate between the pursuit of law
enforcement goals and the pursuit of the media's goals-a distinction
that is determinative of the reasonableness of an intrusion under the
Fourth Amendment.132 In Wilson, the Court held that there was a
Fourth Amendment violation when police permitted a reporter and
photographer from the Washington Post to accompany police during
the execution of an arrest warrant.s33 Neither the print reporter nor
the photographer was "involved in the execution of the Warrant," but
the pair observed and photographed it nonetheless.134 The Court
found that the reporter and photographer were "working on a story for
their own purposes," and therefore were in the suspect's house in
violation of the suspect's Fourth Amendment rights.135 In Wilson's
companion case, Hanlon, the Court similarly found a Fourth
Amendment violation when CNN camera crews entered the plaintiffs
property with federal agents during the execution of a warrant.136
Although the crew did not enter the home, they recorded an agent's
conversations with the plaintiff.137 The Court affirmed the US Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's decision, which reasoned that,
"[blecause the media was present for 'a major purpose other than law
enforcement,' that is, to obtain 'material for . .. commercial
programming,' the intrusion was unreasonable and the search violated
129. See id. at 390.
130. Id. at 390-91 (citing Berger v. Hanlon, 526 U.S. 808 (1999); Wilson v. Layne, 526
U.S. 603 (1999)).
131. See infra notes 141-50 and accompanying text.
132. See Berger, 526 U.S. at 809-10; Wilson, 526 U.S. at 605-06 (1999).
133. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 605-06.
134. Id. at 608.
135. Id. at 613.
136. Hanlon, 526 U.S. at 809.
137. Id.
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the Fourth Amendment."138 The media's non-governmental interest in
the search rendered the search unreasonable.139
In Conradt, the court followed Hanlon, concluding that,
"[A]ithough the amended complaint does not allege that Dateline
representatives entered the house, it does plausibly allege, in
substance, that Dateline personnel were 'active participants in
planned activity that transformed the execution of [the warrants] into
television entertainment."'
140
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that law enforcement
has an important governmental interest in allowing the media certain
liberties; however, courts must balance those liberties against the
individual's privacy interests.141 In Wilson, the Court recognized the
importance of the press in "informing the general public about the
administration of criminal justice."142  And the media has a
responsibility to convey this information.143 Quoting Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn, the Wilson Court declared, "in a society in which each
individual has but limited time and resources with which to observe at
first hand the operations of his government, he relies necessarily upon
the press to bring him in convenient form the facts of those
operations."14 4 Nonetheless, the Court implicitly subscribed to a tenet
138. Conradt, 536 F. Supp. 2d at 391 (citing Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505, 510-11 (9th
Cir. 1997) vacated and remanded, 526 U.S. 808 (1999), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded
in part, 188 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 1999)).
139. See id.
140. Id. (quoting Hanlon, 129 F.3d at 512). Police prepared to execute the warrant at
Conradt's residence on the afternoon of November 5, 2006. Id. at 386 (citing Conradt Complaint,
supra note 120, 1 34-36). Hansen and ten personnel from TCAP, as well as one official from
PJF, were on location at Conradt's house. Id. (citing Conradt Complaint, supra note 120, 1 36).
Cameras were rolling as police discussed how they would execute the warrant, at times speaking
with NBC personnel and addressing the camera. Id. (citing Conradt Complaint, supra note 120,
1 36). The Murphy police chief told Hansen that here would be a delay as a SWAT team was
coming to the location despite the fact that a sergeant who knew Conradt for twenty years
informed police that he did not think Conradt owned a gun. Id. (citing Conradt Complaint, supra
note 120, 1 37). When the SWAT team entered the house and announced itself, Conradt said "I'm
not gonna hurt anyone [sic]," and shot himself. Id. (citing Conradt Complaint, supra note 120, T
41). A police officer reported on camera that Conradt had shot himself, and another officer
allegedly told a Dateline producer "That'll make good TV." Id. (citing Conradt Complaint, supra
note 120, 1 42). Conradt died at a Dallas hospital less than an hour later. Id. (citing Conradt
Complaint, supra note 120, ¶ 42). Under these circumstances, the court in Conradt held "that a
reasonable jury could find that the intrusion on Conradt's privacy substantially outweighed the
promotion of legitimate governmental interests." Id. at 390. The court based this judgment in
part on the alleged facts that "Dateline was camped outside Conradt's house with cameras and
crew, waiting to film his arrest for a national television show, as a SWAT team entered his
home," despite the fact that Conradt did not even travel to the sting house. Id.
141. E.g., Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299-300 (1999).
142. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 612 (1999).
143. See discussion supra Part I.B.
144. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 612-13 (quoting Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491-92
(1975)).
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of the social-responsibility theory of the press,145 finding that the
media's role must be judged against the suspect's Fourth Amendment
rights.146 Consequently, the Court opined, "And even the need for
accurate reporting on police issues in general bears no direct relation
to the constitutional justification for the police intrusion into a home
in order to execute a felony arrest warrant."147 Thus, the Court held
that the police violated the suspect's Fourth Amendment rights when
it brought members of the media into the suspect's home during the
execution of the warrant and not in aid of the warrant. 1 4 8  In
balancing the governmental interest in allowing the media to report
on law enforcement issues against the individual's privacy rights, the
Court seemed to draw a line at the front door of a suspect's private
residence.149 Wilson leaves unsettled whether any media conduct that
is under color of law can be reasonable.
Although the media's interests are sometimes consonant with
law enforcement's interests, the media's exclusive interests-that is,
interests that the media alone has-carry no weight in Fourth
Amendment balancing.150 In other words, if a § 1983 plaintiff can
prove that a media intrusion does not support the narrow
governmental interest in dissemination of information to the public,
the plaintiff will have proven that the media's intrusion is
unreasonable.15 1 Thus, the best way members of the media can avoid
rendering the execution of a warrant unreasonable is by reducing
their participation in a "search" or "seizure," ensuring that their
participation serves the narrow governmental interest of informing
the public.152
145. See FRED S. SIEBERT ET AL., FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS 73 (1963).
146. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 613.
147. Id.
148. In support of its conclusion, the Court stated:
But the Fourth Amendment also protects a very important right, and in the present
case it is in terms of that right that the media ride-alongs must be judged. . . . We hold
that it is a violation of the Fourth Amendment for police to bring members of the
media or other third parties into a home during the execution of a warrant when the
presence of the third parties in the home was not in aid of the execution of the
warrant.
Id. at 613-14. Traditionally, the Court had held that a third party is a permissible aid only when
its presence is necessary to the execution of the warrant, such as when the third party can
identify stolen property. Id. at 611-12 (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 628 (1886)).
The media's role, the acquisition and dissemination of information related to the warrant, is
probably unnecessary to its execution. Thus, it is difficult to imagine a situation where the media
would constitute a permissible third party. See id.
149. See id. at 613-14.
150. See id. at 612-13.
151. See id. at 613-14.
152. See id.
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For instance, if a journalist passively observes law enforcement
from outside a suspect's property, the intrusion is minimal. And
passive observation from outside the suspect's property is probably not
under color of law, as there is no conspiracy under the
joint-participation doctrine.153 Indeed, the under-color-of-law element
correlates to the degree of intrusion, such that when the intrusion is
minimal, the journalist's conduct probably will not be under color of
law. This is because, for lesser intrusions, members of the media
probably do not need to act in concert with law enforcement agents;
and, if they do not need to act in concert with law enforcement agents
to commit the intrusion, they have no incentive to potentially incur
liability by doing so. In Wilson, media entry into a suspect's house
was unreasonable because the suspect's privacy rights outweighed the
governmental interest in informing the public.154 If the Washington
Post reporter and photographer had remained passively outside the
suspect's property, the Court probably would have reached a different
result.155 Although the Wilson Court did not indicate what level of
journalist participation is reasonable for discovery of reportable law
enforcement information,156 it should be minimal, given the suspect's
countervailing privacy interests.
c. Principle 3: Filming may constitute a search or seizure, and therefore
may be inherently unreasonable if it does not promote solely
governmental interests
Members of the media should limit their conduct to passive
observation-and avoid filming-when operating in tandem with law
enforcement. Although the media can narrowly promote a
governmental interest, it is no surprise that the potential for members
of the media to violate a suspect's Fourth Amendment rights is great
when the media participates in the execution of a warrant.157 The
media's passive filming of the execution of a warrant from outside the
suspect's property will probably not incur liability because, if it is
independent of law enforcement, it is not under color of law.158 But
because the act of filming may constitute a search, and the film itself a
153. See supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
155. See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 609-10 (emphasizing the heightened privacy expectations in
a home).
156. See generally id. at 603.
157. See, e.g., id.
158. See Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680, 683-84 (2d Cir. 1994).
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seizure, the conduct may still be actionable under § 1983 if it is
sanctioned by law enforcement.159
The Second Circuit in Ayeni v. Mottola held that a film crew's
"video and sound recordings were 'seizures' under the Fourth
Amendment" because they were "unnecessary to the purpose of the
search."160 In Ayeni, journalists recorded law enforcement activity in
the plaintiffs home.161 The Second Circuit held that this was a
particularly egregious violation of the Fourth Amendment because the
home is where utmost privacy is expected.162 But a crucial component
of this holding is that, regardless of the location of the filming, the
filming itself may be a seizure.163 Thus, a court could extrapolate from
Ayeni that members of the media violate a suspect's rights every time
they film the execution of a warrant, so long as the filming does not
strictly promote a governmental interest.164  The question then
becomes whether filming can promote a governmental interest, and it
would be difficult for a journalist to convincingly argue that dramatic
footage is necessary to disseminate sufficient information.
Based on Ayeni, Dateline may have violated predators' Fourth
Amendment rights while producing TCAP. Although privacy
expectations are diminished in a sting house,165 based on Ayeni,
159. See id. at 688-89.
160. Id. at 688.
161. Id. at 683.
162. Id. at 689. See also the Second Circuit's history of the Fourth Amendment, stating:
The Fourth Amendment seizure has long encompassed the seizure of intangibles as
well as tangibles. Although "[i]t is true that . . . at one time . . . th[e] [Fourth]
Amendment was thought to limit only searches and seizures of tangible property ...
'[tihe premise that property interests control the right of the Government to search
and seize has been discredited."' The Supreme Court has "expressly held that the
Fourth Amendment governs not only the seizure of tangible items," but also extends
to the seizure of intangibles.
Caldarola v. Cnty. of Westchester, 343 F.3d 570, 574 (2d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted) (quoting
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967)).
163. See Ayeni, 35 F.3d at 688.
164. See id. at 688-89.
165. The Tiwari court noted that the fact that the intrusion occurred in a sting house
and in a pre-booking room at the Petaluma Airport-where the reasonable expectation of privacy
is arguably diminished-does not preclude the possibility of a Fourth Amendment violation.
Tiwari v. NBC Universal, Inc., No. C-08-3988, 2011 WL 5079505, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2011)
(citing Lauro v. Charles, 219 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2000)). The court stated,
In Lauro, the issue was whether a staged "perp walk"-i.e., a transfer of an arrestee
by the police from one location to another, done at the request of the press and for no
reason other than to allow the arrestee to be photographed-violated the Fourth
Amendment. . . . This was clearly a public area over which the arrestee lacked
dominion and control, and not a private home. The court, however, rejected the
defendant's contention that there could be no Fourth Amendment violation because
the arrestee had no reasonable expectation of privacy outside of a private home. . . .
[B]ut prior case law, the court emphasized, did not "turn solely on the special status of
the home" or say that "the Fourth Amendment's privacy protections end at the door of
one's house."
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Dateline committed a seizure when it captured footage of the predator
under arrest.166 As the Tiwari court noted, even though the
subsequent broadcasting of the footage enjoys First Amendment
protections, the production is not "so inherently intertwined" with
broadcasting that the two acts should "be treated as a single uniform
act."167 But even if the filming constitutes a search or seizure, the
court was unclear about whether it was an unreasonable search or
seizure.168
If the media's conduct increased the magnitude of the search or
seizure-such as by filming-a court should find that the resulting
search or seizure is unreasonable because the modification of the
search or seizure does not promote a governmental interest or
objective of the warrant.169 But the Conradt and Tiwari courts have
struggled to apply this standard.170 Furthermore, it is not intuitive to
journalists. Members of the media are untrained in civil rights law
and may believe that when law enforcement personnel sanction their
conduct, the conduct is per se lawful. Thus, they may be surprised to
learn that the cooperation of law enforcement personnel does not
preclude them from incurring liability, but rather exposes them to it,
as they may be acting under color of law. Additionally, while
members of law enforcement are entitled to qualified immunity when
a constitutional right is not clearly established, members of the media
enjoy no such protection.171 Therefore, to aid judges, journalists, and
private individuals, courts should adopt a clearer standard. Part III.A
advances a "media influence" test, which is a workable, unambiguous
Id.; see also id. at *9 (quoting Caldarola v. Cnty. of Westchester, 345 F.3d 570, 576 (2d Cir.
2003)) ("A careful reading of Lauro . . . reveals that it was not the magnitude of Lauro's privacy
interest that enabled him to prevail on his claim, but instead the lack of any legitimate purpose
served by 'an inherently fictional dramatization of an event that transpired hours earlier."'). But
if the show were ever brought back, given the widespread viewership and popular references to
TCAP, it may be that the expectation of privacy in the sting houses will have decreased over
time, as any potential "predator" assumes a certain risk when he pursues an online lead in spite
of knowledge of the show. See supra Part I and infra Part III.A. This dynamic expectation of
privacy is best illustrated in the case of one predator who was a "predator" on TCAP in two
separate instances. See Chris Hansen, A repeat 'predator' in our eighth investigation,
MSNBC.coM (Jan. 29, 2007), http://insidedateline.nbenews.com/_news/2007/01/29/4374238-a-
repeat-predator-in-our-eighth-investigation?lite.
166. See Ayeni, 35 F.3d at 688.
167. Tiwari, 2011 WL 5079505, at *5.
168. See generally id.
169. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 613-14 (1999).
170. See Tiwari, 2011 WL 5079505, at *4; Conradt v. NBC'Universal, Inc., 536 F. Supp.
2d 380, 389-91 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
171. See Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161, 167-68 (1992) (reasoning that qualified
immunity for government officials that is necessary to protect their ability to act in the public
good is not transferable to private parties); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
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test for determining whether and when journalists violate the Fourth
Amendment.172
B. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED)
Unlike the prescriptive purposes of constitutional law, tort law
serves a more remedial purpose.173 It is for this reason that courts
should distinguish clearly between what conduct is protected by the
First Amendment and, conversely, what conduct exposes a journalist
to liability for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED). 174
Otherwise, an IIED cause of action-often considered a "gap-filler"
tort17 5-may have the unintended consequence of authorizing juries
with varying conceptions of "outrageousness" to instigate a recession
of First Amendment protections on which journalists reasonably
rely. 176
An IIED cause of action generally exists when "[o]ne, who by
extreme and outrageous conduct, intentionally or recklessly causes
severe emotional distress to another . . . ."17 Under the cause of
action, the defendant "is subject to liability for such emotional
distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily
172. See discussion infra Part III.A.
173. The following describes differences between tort law and constitutional law:
In tort law, telling people what they should do is a secondary enterprise; whatever
effect tort law has in guiding conduct arises from what it does post facto in the course
of adjusting losses. Precision, clarity, and certainty therefore seem, at least, to be less
important than they would be if tort law were in the business of explicitly prescribing
conduct. Constitutional law is in that business, however; it exists to tell government
actors what they must or must not do, and the importance of clarity and certainty are
therefore obvious. Tort law is majoritarian (or perhaps populist): It assumes that lay
people are at least as likely as judges to make good decisions on many of the questions
that ultimately determine tort liability. Because of its countermajoritarian purposes,
that assumption is unavailable in much of constitutional law.
David A. Anderson, First Amendment Limitations on Tort Law, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 755, 765
(2004).
174. See id.
175. See Conradt, 536 F. Supp. 2d at 396 (quoting Creditwatch, Inc. v. Jackson, 157
S.W.3d 814, 816 (Tex. 2005)).
176. In support of this proposition, Anderson notes:
In contrast, a central tenet of First Amendment law is distrust of juries. The jury,
once thought to be the chief protector of free speech, is now considered one of its chief
threats. The Court has made its First Amendment limitations on tort law effective
primarily by limiting the jury's power. In defamation, the First Amendment takes
away much of the jury's power to find actual malice, presume harm, and determine
what is defamatory. It diminishes a jury's power to decide when public figures should
be able to recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress or when disclosures of
private facts should be actionable as invasion of privacy.
Anderson, supra note 173, at 764 (footnotes omitted).
177. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
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harm."178 Given the investigative and often adversarial role members
of the media play when pursuing a story, members of the media are
naturally more likely to expose themselves to IIED claims than are
private individuals.179 And yet members of the media are still liable
for IIED under the same analysis as lay persons.180 IIED causes of
action rely on subjective determinations by judges and juries, but this
subjectivity leads to unclear standards for journalists who push the
envelope of what is acceptable in the field.181
While Part II.A argued for clearer standards to control
investigative journalists, this section counsels toward protection of the
investigative journalist in the context of IIED liability. This section
discusses the implications of IIED causes of action for investigative
journalists and concludes that courts need to carefully establish
standards regarding when the First Amendment protects a
journalist's conduct from the vagaries of IIED liability so as not to
chill First Amendment exercise.
1. IIED Claims Generally
Although the elements of the claim vary in each state, IIED
claims traditionally consist of the following four elements: (1) the
defendant's conduct is extreme and outrageous; (2) the defendant's
conduct is intentional or reckless; (3) the defendant's conduct causes
the plaintiff emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress is
severe.182 In the context of investigative journalism, an analysis of
what conduct is "extreme and outrageous" is especially important, as
it will substantially influence the media's pre-broadcast conduct.183 As
the media performs an important societal function, courts should
distinguish between "outrageous" media conduct and "outrageous"
conduct in general. In other words, when analyzing the first element
of the IIED claim, courts should appreciate (1) the media's
178. Id.; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 45
(Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007) ("An actor who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or
recklessly causes severe emotional disturbance to another is subject to liability for that
emotional disturbance. . . .").
179. See Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680, 688-89; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46
(1965).
180. See Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 167-68.
181. See Daniel Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of
Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82 COLUM.
L. REV. 42, 51-52 (1982).
182. See John J. Kircher, The Four Faces of Tort Law: Liability for Emotional Harm, 90
MARQ. L. REV. 789, 852 app. B (2007) (analyzing elements of IIED in each state).
183. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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unique-yet valuable-ability to disseminate information about a
suspect, and (2) the media's heightened First Amendment protections.
2. What Constitutes "Outrageous" Media Conduct?
If members of the media are investigating a suspect for a
crime, the suspect might consider their investigation "outrageous,"
especially if the suspect knows that he is innocent. And the suspect
might be more susceptible to emotional distress-knowing that a
member of the media has the power to disseminate information about
the suspect. But courts must be careful not to allow a suspect's
susceptibility to IIED chill First Amendment rights, and should
therefore exclude notions of the journalist's public duty to disseminate
information from the court's "outrageousness" analysis.
a. The Restatement
The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides some guidance on
the meaning of "outrageousness"; however, this guidance invariably
leads to subjective judgments by a jury or judge.184 The Restatement
suggests that "insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty
oppressions, or other trivialities" do not constitute outrageous conduct,
and that "[1]iability has been found only where the conduct has been
so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond
all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and
utterly intolerable in a civilized community."18 5 In addition, the
conduct is outrageous if an average member of society who has heard
the facts responds, "Outrageous!"8 6 The Restatement also lists four
descriptive categories of conduct that can lead to IIED:
(1) abusing a position of power; (2) emotionally harming a plaintiff known to be
especially vulnerable; (3) repeating or continuing conduct that may be tolerable when
committed once but becomes intolerable when committed numerous times; and (4)
committing or threatening violence or serious economic harm to a person or property in
which the plaintiff is known to have a special interest.
1 8 7
Journalists are most susceptible to the first two categories, because of
journalists' inherent power to disseminate information to the public
about a subject, and because of journalists' typical informational
advantage over potentially vulnerable subjects.*188
184. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965); Givelber, supra note 181.
185. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965).
186. Id.
187. Kircher, supra note 182, at 803.
188. See id.
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b. Outrageousness and the Media
Because what actually constitutes "outrageous" conduct is
subjective, it is difficult to construct common-law standards that
substantially inform members of the media, especially in situations
that may be "close calls."89 As Professor Daniel Givelber noted, an
IED claim
differs from traditional intentional torts in an important respect: it provides no clear
definition of the prohibited conduct.... It does not objectively describe an act or series
of acts; rather, it represents an evaluation of behavior. The concept thus fails to provide
clear guidance either to those whose conduct it purports to regulate, or to those who
must evaluate that conduct.1 9 0
The consequent ambiguity subjects the media to the whims of judges
and juries whose mere instincts determine the propriety of the media's
conduct.191
While courts that describe "outrageousness" may have provided
sufficient guidance such that a reasonable person can conduct his
affairs in a way that avoids liability, members of the media often must
be more confrontational than private persons.192 Thus, an ordinary
private citizen will typically regulate his conduct in accordance with a
social code that does not tolerate "outrageous" conduct. But a
journalist will be ineffective if she adheres to universal social norms.
Notwithstanding the Conradt court's suggestion that journalists'
ethical codes are relevant to outrageousness,193 those standards
should not inform the "outrageousness" standard. This is because,
similar to a private citizen's social code, journalism codes are typically
conservative and draw the line of what constitutes ethical behavior far
below "outrageousness."194 For instance, if a journalist violates codes
of journalistic ethics, the conduct is surely unprofessional, but the
violation may not rise to the level of being "outrageous," especially in
189. See Givelber, supra note 181, at 51-53.
190. Id. at 51.
191. See Kircher, supra note 182, at 799 ("In the Restatement's view, the court
determines whether the defendant's conduct can reasonably be viewed as so outrageous as to
permit recovery, and where reasonable minds might differ, the jury decides.").
192. See Anderson, supra note 173, at 803 ("Such [speech-tort] conflicts implicate values
of the highest order: freedom of speech and freedom of the press on one side, and on the other,
reputation, honor, privacy, civility, personal integrity, and physical safety.").
193. The court stated:
The reporter-subject relationship is not monitored by statute, but the profession is
guided by self-enforced principles and standards of practice. Although unethical
conduct, by itself, does not necessarily equate to outrageous conduct, the failure to
abide by these journalistic standards may indeed be relevant to the jury's
determination of whether Dateline acted in a reckless and outrageous manner.
Conradt v. NBC Universal, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 2d 380, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
194. See Code of Conduct, supra note 84.
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light of the high bar recognized by courts with respect to IIED
claims.195 Moreover, a conservative journalistic code of ethics may be
incompatible with contemporary investigative-journalism practices
and may be too static to govern nuanced situations in the rapidly
evolving world in which members of the media operate.
The resulting ambiguity and lack of guidance for the media as
to what conduct may lead to IIED liability is problematic. Courts
should be concerned particularly in the context of media IED liability,
as the absence of clear standards can chill media members'
journalistic efforts. There is also a correlative concern for the
individuals affected by the media's potentially "outrageous conduct,"
as members of the media are repeat players and therefore have the
ability to injure numerous future subjects.196
c. The Media's "Position of Power" in Conradt and Tiwari
Tiwari and Conradt shed some light on when a journalist's
conduct gives rise to an IIED claim.197 The district courts both
concluded that NBC's conduct could be outrageous if NBC
sensationalized the events.198 The Tiwari court took note of Conradt's
ruling: "In Conradt, Judge Chin noted that, as alleged, NBC did not
simply conduct an investigation and inform law enforcement of the
decedent's suspected criminal activity."199  The court in Conradt
pointed to the first two of the four categories in which IIED claims
often arise:
Significantly, two of the circumstances that give rise to a finding of outrageousness are
arguably present here: NBC was in a position of power, both with its ability to
disseminate information to the public and with its apparent influence over the police,
and NBC knew or should have known that Conradt was peculiarly susceptible to
emotional distress and suicide.
2 0 0
The categories identified by the Conradt court, position of
power and susceptibility of plaintiff, are particularly relevant to
195. See JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS (MB) § 7.10 (2012) ('The
case reports carry numerous judicial approvals of the exercise of the trial judge's refusal to
entertain a cause of action. Too numerous to merit citation, these decisions should suffice to
carry the message that this tort-of-outrage cause of action is not lightly recognized.").
196. Although NBC Universal, Inc. is a defendant in multiple lawsuits, see Tiwari v.
NBC Universal, Inc., No. C-08-3988 EMC, 2011 WL 5079505 at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2011);
Conradt v. NBC Universal, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 2d 380, 380 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), this has not stopped
other networks from airing investigative-journalism programs. See supra notes 35-37 and
accompanying text.
197. See Tiwari, 2011 WL 5079505, at *1; Conradt, 536 F. Supp. 2d at 380.
198. See Tiwari, 2011 WL 5079505, at *11; Conradt, 536 F. Supp. 2d at 396-97.
199. Tiwari, 2011 WL 5079505, at *10.
200. Conradt, 536 F. Supp. 2d at 397.
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investigative journalists.201 But courts must carefully consider the
journalist's unique function when weighing these factors.
Investigative journalists often work with, or alongside,
law enforcement personnel, giving them a patina of power.202 And the
suspects arguably are more susceptible to emotional distress than
ordinary individuals, assuming, as researchers have observed, that
criminal suspects represent a less stable segment of society.203 Of
course, the court in Conradt was referring to a special susceptibility in
Mr. Conradt because he was a public official, not because he was a
potential sex offender. But the concept of susceptibility can
persuasively apply also to Mr. Tiwari, as a suspected sex offender with
particular weaknesses revealed in his chats with PJF.2 0 4 Thus, in
Tiwari, the court suggested that, "if NBC did, as alleged. . . , direct
the police to arrest Mr. Tiwari in a dramatic fashion with guns raised
when there was no basis for such an approach, that act alone might be
found outrageous."2 0 5 Hence, it is possible to imagine a jury that
would find Mr. Tiwari's allegations, if proven, "outrageous."206
Another position of power to which the Conradt court alluded is
the "ability to disseminate information to the public."207 But courts
should not treat this power as carrying with it a greater probability of
outrageousness and IIED liability. This is a position of power that is
protected by the First Amendment, and courts need to treat it as such.
Thus, as proposed in Part III.B, courts should vindicate journalists'
crucial First Amendment rights by excluding the "ability to
disseminate information to the public" from the "outrageousness"
analysis. That way, journalists, who deserve greater First
Amendment protection, can carry out their important societal function
without fear of recrimination caused solely by the journalist's
execution of that function.
III. CLEARER STANDARDS: PRINCIPLES THE COURTS SHOULD ESTABLISH
IN Two RELEVANT CAUSES OF ACTION: § 1983 AND IIED
The district court opinions in Tiwari and Conradt, discussed in
Parts II.A and II.B, demonstrate that the law is currently unclear
201. See id.
202. See id. (noting NBC's "apparent influence over the police").
203. See, e.g., Edward J. Ferentz, Mental Deficiency Related to Crime, 45 J. CRIM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 299, 299-302 (1954) (describing prior studies regarding the
relationship between mental deficiency and crime).
204. See Tiwari, 2011 WL 5079505, at *11; Conradt, 536 F. Supp. 2d at 394-95.
205. See Tiwari, 2011 WL 5079505, at *11.
206. See id.
207. Conradt, 536 F. Supp. 2d at 397.
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about when a journalist is liable for her action in concert with law
enforcement personnel. This section proposes two ways courts can
clearly enunciate the governing law. When adjudicating § 1983
claims, courts should follow the "media influence" test, outlined in
Part III.A, to ensure that members of the media are passively
observing law enforcement personnel, rather than participating in law
enforcement. And in the context of IIED claims, courts must be
careful not to infringe upon journalists' First Amendment protections,
for instance by improperly considering a journalist's ability to
disseminate information when deciding the "outrageousness" element
of the tort claim.
A. A Workable Fourth Amendment Test
This Note has discussed the media's potential to commit
Fourth Amendment violations when interfering with searches and
seizures. But it is unclear what conduct is permissible and will not
give rise to a § 1983 claim. This is an important question because the
media has an obligation to investigate and collect information in order
to fulfill its responsibility of informing the public about criminal
matters. Courts therefore need to establish standards that guide
journalists as to what conduct is permissible so that journalists can
simultaneously inform the public and avoid violating individuals'
constitutionally protected rights. The "media influence" test enables
courts to decide more easily whether journalists are liable under
§ 1983. It is also easier for investigative journalists-who are
untrained in the law-to follow, and will help ensure journalists are
aware of what conduct may subject them to liability. Perhaps most
importantly, it ensures accuracy by striking a balance between the
narrow governmental interest in disseminating law enforcement
information to the public, which the media advances, and the suspect's
privacy interests.
1. Passive Observation
As an initial matter, a journalist will not be liable under § 1983
so long as the journalist does not act under color of law.2 0 8 Under the
"media influence" test outlined in the next section, members of the
media will probably be liable for violating § 1983 if they interfere with,
or influence, law enforcement decisions, but not if they passively
208. See supra Part II.A.1.c.
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observe law enforcement.209 The Ninth Circuit's opinion in Hanlon
raises the distinction between active involvement and passive
observation. The court stated that when members of the media
allegedly directed police personnel as to their execution of the warrant
in order to promote journalistic goals, which included increased
entertainment value, they may have committed an unreasonable
intrusion.210 The court reasoned that the conduct may have been a
conspiracy with police (under color of law), and did not promote a
significant governmental interest (unreasonable search or seizure).211
But if members of the media merely filmed events from outside a
house being searched pursuant to a warrant, and if they did not
interfere with, participate in, or direct the execution of the warrant,
then they would probably avoid liability, as the conduct will not be
under color of law.2 12 Thus, the journalist could still disseminate
information about the search in fulfillment of her journalistic
duties.213 In sum, when members of the media passively observe law
enforcement, they probably do not satisfy the joint-participation
doctrine, discussed in Part II.A.1.c, because they are not in conspiracy
with members of law enforcement and therefore should not satisfy the
under-color-of-law requirement of a § 1983 claim.
Additionally, passive observation-without more-warrants
First Amendment protection and furthers a legitimate governmental
interest.214 Generally, the First Amendment protects the broadcast of
events so long as the broadcast does not include speech that is
defamatory or violate another established right, such as the Fourth
Amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.215
In Tiwari, the plaintiff alleged that NBC violated his Fourth
Amendment right against unreasonable seizures when NBC invaded
his privacy "in a manner designed to cause humiliation to [Mr. Tiwari]
with no legitimate enforcement purpose or objective."216 NBC sought
to dismiss this claim, asserting its First Amendment right to
broadcast TCAP.2 1 7 Tiwari countered that he was "not seeking
209. See Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505, 512, 514-15 (9th Cir. 1997), vacated and
remanded, 526 U.S. 808 (1999), affd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded in part, 188 F.3d 1155
(9th Cir. 1999).
210. Berger, 129 F.3d at 510-11.
211. Id.
212. See Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 920 (1984).
213. See id.; supra notes 141-149 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 141-149 and accompanying text.
215. See Tiwari v. NBC Universal, Inc., No. C-08-3988 EMC, 2011 WL 5079505, at *5
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2011) (citing Desnick v. Am. Broad. Cos., 44 F.3d 1345, 1355 (7th Cir. 1995)).
216. Id. at *3.
217. Id. at *4.
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damages based on NBC's 'dissemination of information' (which
constitutes speech) but rather [sought] damages based on NBC's 'act
of information gathering' (which constitutes conduct only)." 2 18 This
raises the question of what degree of involvement in the execution of a
warrant is passive, such that the media will avoid liability. 2 19 As
discussed in the next section, this Note suggests that filming, without
more, should not give rise to liability because it is not under color of
law, whereas filming with participation of law enforcement personnel
should give rise to liability, as it is a seizure and does occur under
color of law.
2. The "Media Influence" Test
Because the act of filming can be a search, and the recording a
seizure,220 a journalist who films in concert with police will be in
violation of § 1983, so long as the filming does not promote a
governmental interest.2 21 If members of the media have intentionally
or recklessly influenced the police so that the magnitude of a search or
seizure increases as a result-whether through the media's filming or
through the police's own conduct-a court should find the consequent
search or seizure unreasonable.2 2 2 That is because the marginal
increase in the degree of the search or seizure has promoted a
non-governmental interest: the interest of the media.223 This simple
articulation, referred to as the "media influence" test, asks whether
the media has intentionally or recklessly influenced police to
determine whether a journalist has committed an unreasonable
search or seizure.224 The test is simple, yet effective, because it
embraces a Fourth Amendment nuance: any increase in the
magnitude of a search or seizure that is not counterbalanced by a
governmental interest is outweighed by Fourth Amendment privacy
interests.225
In implementing the test, courts should grant police some
leeway to inform the press about searches and seizures-an important
218. Id.
219. See Conradt v. NBC Universal, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 2d 380, 389-91 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
220. See Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680, 685 (2d Cir. 1994). Contra Caldarola v. Cnty. of
Westchester, 142 F. Supp. 2d 431, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) ("Plaintiffs were not 'seized,'
unreasonably or otherwise, by virtue of being videotaped.").
221. See Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 920 (1984).
222. See Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505, 512 (9th Cir. 1997), vacated and remanded, 526
U.S. 808 (1999), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded in part, 188 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 1999);
Conradt, 536 F. Supp. 2d at 390.
223. See Hanlon, 129 F.3d at 511-12.
224. See Conradt, 536 F. Supp. 2d at 390.
225. See id. at 389-90.
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part of the administration of law enforcement-but police should
maintain, and adhere to, policies that ensure that journalists do not
influence police procedures. In other words, courts should require
journalists to play a passive role. For instance, informing the media
about a "perp walk" may be permissible, but staging a "perp walk" for
entertainment, when it serves no governmental purpose, should not be
permissible.
If the media is passive and simply observes a "perp walk" in a
public place and then accurately reports the event in a news article,
the conduct has not violated the suspect's rights and any resulting
dissemination of information about the event constitutes protected
speech.226 If members of the media film the event, they may have
conducted a search and a seizure under Ayeni;2 2 7 however, they
importantly have not done so under color of law, because there was no
conspiracy or joint participation.2 28 But if members of the media
direct law enforcement personnel to stage a "perp walk," and then film
the walk,2 2 9 courts should consider the media members' conduct to
have intentionally resulted in a search or seizure under color of law
because the media intensified the magnitude of-or even
initiated-the event that constituted a search or seizure. The media
in this hypothetical directed law enforcement personnel and thus
acted under color of law.2 30 Additionally, since police are presumably
not advancing a governmental interest when they act under direction
from the media, the increase in magnitude of the search or seizure is
likely unreasonable.23 1
In practice, the court should permit a plaintiffs § 1983 claim to
proceed past the summary judgment stage if the complaint sufficiently
pleads that members of the media have intentionally or recklessly
acted to influence the police in such a way that the suspect's rights
have been violated. The jury instructions should include the same
test. Instructions regarding intentional or reckless influence hinge on
whether there is a conspiracy, which is determined by the degree of
226. See supra notes 141-149 and accompanying text.
227. Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680, 686 (2d Cir. 1994).
228. See supra notes 106-107, 125-127 and accompanying text.
229. See Lauro v. Charles, 219 F.3d 202, 213 (2d Cir. 2000).
230. See Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 920 (1984).
231. See Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505, 512, 514-15 (9th Cir. 1997), vacated and
remanded, 526 U.S. 808 (1999), affd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded in part, 188 F.3d 1155
(9th Cir. 1999); Conradt v. NBC Universal, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 2d 380, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). But
see Caldarola v. Cnty. of Westchester, 142 F. Supp. 2d 431, 435, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(distinguishing the situation from Lauro because the "perp walk" in Lauro served no
governmental interest while the "perp walk" at bar was not staged and served the legitimate
government interest of informing the public about abuse of disability benefits by public
employees).
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overt cooperation that exists.232 If the jury finds that the media has
influenced law enforcement in such a way that the journalist has
"conspired with state officials to deprive another of federal rights," the
media has indeed acted under color of law.23 3
The jury would decide the media's intentionality, and, if the
media has not intentionally or recklessly influenced the police
conduct, but has nonetheless filmed law enforcement, the media would
probably not be liable under § 1983 because the filming was not under
color of law.23 4
The injury, in the Fourth Amendment context, is typically an
invasion of privacy or property, whether through a search or
seizure.235 If police have altered their conduct and increased the
magnitude of the intrusion at the direction of the media, the
consequent intrusion is unreasonable since the police will not have
intruded in promotion of a governmental interest but instead in
promotion of an entertainment interest.236  An increase in the
magnitude of the search or seizure would thus constitute the injury,
and the plaintiff should succeed on the claim.2 37 For example, under
the media influence test, when members of law enforcement stage a
"perp walk" at the direction of members of the media, there is an
additional privacy intrusion under color of law that serves no
governmental purpose. Consequently, the controlling members of the
media are liable. If the jury finds intentionality and a conspiracy,
then the media has deprived the individual of federal rights so long as
an injury has occurred.238
The test will allow courts to answer the difficult question that
remained after Wilson: whether the media's intrusion-if under color
of law-should ever be reasonable. By framing the question as one
that asks whether the media had any influence over law enforcement,
courts can decide on a case-by-case basis whether the media, although
acting under color of law, promoted only the narrow governmental
interest in disseminating information to the public. If a judge or jury
232. See Brunette v. Humane Soc'y of Ventura Cnty., 294 F.3d 1205, 1212 (C.D. Cal.
1997) (affirming the dismissal of a § 1983 claim, finding no implicit coordinated conspiracy
between the Humane Society and the media).
233. See Tower, 467 U.S. at 920.
234. See id.
235. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
236. See Hanlon v. Berger, 526 U.S. 808, 809-10 (1999) (reaffirming that the Fourth
Amendment is violated when the police allow the media to accompany them during the execution
of a warrant in a home); cf. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 613-14 (1999) (noting that a reporter,
who accompanied the police during the execution of the warrant, was "acting for private
purposes").
237. See Conradt v. NBC Universal, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 2d 380, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
238. See Tower, 467 U.S. at 920.
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finds that the media had no influence over the police, but still
committed a search or seizure under color of law, then it is indeed
possible for the media to operate in conspiracy with police, but without
violating the suspect's Fourth Amendment rights.
3. The Media Influence Test Applied to Conradt and Tiwari
By applying the media influence test to the facts alleged in
Conradt and Tiwari, it appears that the test promotes putative
interests of law enforcement, while establishing a standard that
protects a zone of First Amendment speech when the media is truly
passive. Although the two cases have since settled,239 this application
should guide courts in understanding how to apply the media
influence test in future cases. In Conradt, if the jury found (1) that
police would not have sought and executed a warrant at Mr. Conradt's
house, (2) that police would not have acted in an aggressive manner
(e.g., with guns drawn), and (3) that Dateline intentionally or
recklessly encouraged such conduct, Dateline would be liable under
§ 1983. As pleaded, the increase in magnitude served a
non-governmental interest-entertainment value-and therefore
constituted an unreasonable search and seizure at the direction of the
media (under color of law).2 4 0 Similarly, if a jury in Tiwari found at
trial that police would not have descended upon and seized Mr. Tiwari
with such force if not for Dateline's direction and influence, Dateline
would likewise be liable. If, on the other hand, the jury found that the
police acted in conformity with their standard practices, and the
media did not influence them, then the media would not be liable for
the search and seizure because their actions were not under color of
law (no conspiracy).
This standard puts journalists on notice and deters
interference with law enforcement, returning journalists to their
traditional passive roles of reporting-and not creating-news. The
test is simple to apply and removes the non-governmental interest of
entertainment from law enforcement. If journalists want to film law
enforcement, they must do so without influencing law enforcement
personnel in order to avoid acting under color of law. And if a
journalist acts in cooperation with law enforcement personnel, the
journalist must ensure she does not increase the search or seizure
beyond that which is necessary for dissemination of information;
239. See Stipulation and Order for Voluntary Dismissal of Plaintiffs Claim for
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, Tiwari v. NBC Universal, Inc., No. 03:08-CV-03988
EMC (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2011), ECF No. 117.
240. See supra notes 106-111 and accompanying text.
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filming during the search or seizure itself will likely be off limits to the
media. Not only will this better protect individuals' rights, but it also
ensures only trained law enforcement personnel enforce the law,
which promotes the integrity and precision of an investigation.24 1
B. First Amendment Protections and "Outrageousness" in IED Claims
The Conradt and Tiwari courts failed to carefully address the
second "position of power" that can give rise to an IED claim: "the
ability to disseminate information to the public."242 Courts must not
hold journalists' constitutional rights against them when determining
IED liability.
As discussed above, the court in Tiwari stated that the
production of the broadcast is not "inextricably intertwined" with the
broadcast itself, and therefore the production and filming are not
entitled to First Amendment protection.243 The court was correct in
declaring that the acts of production and broadcast are not
"intertwined" in the sense that they are not one act entitled to the
same protections;244 however, the court should have been equally
careful not to treat as intertwined the manner of the filming and the
simple act of filming. The act of filming, without more, should not add
to "outrageousness" based solely on the suspect's apprehension that
the journalist has First Amendment entitlements to disseminate
information. Such a construction would be antithetical to the
Constitution because it would mean the mere fact that the
Constitution guarantees a journalist basic First Amendment rights,
and that the suspect apprehended those rights, increases a journalist's
probability of incurring liability. This would certainly chill the
exercise of First Amendment rights.245
241. Investigations will also not be fruitless, unlike TCAP investigations in Texas where:
[Collin County District Attorney Roach] said neither police nor NBC could guarantee
the chat logs were authentic and complete. "The fact that somebody besides police
officers were [sic] involved is what makes this case bad," said Roach, who was
informed of the sting in advance but did not participate. "If professionals had been
running the show, they would have done a much better job rather than being at the
beck and call of outsiders."
Associated Press, supra note 25.
242. Tiwari v. NBC Universal, Inc., No. C-08-3988 EMC, 2011 WL 5079505, at *10-11
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2011) (citing Conradt, 536 F. Supp. 2d at 397).
243. Id. at *5 (citing Desnick v. Am. Broad. Cos., 44 F.3d 1345, 1355 (7th Cir.1995)).
244. Id.
245. It is possible that the Conradt court actually meant to use the "ability to
disseminate information to the public" as applicable to the second IIED category-plaintiff
susceptibility-despite describing the circumstance as a "position of power." Conradt,
536 F. Supp. 2d at 397. Mr. Conradt arguably had a greater susceptibility to the powers of the
media because of his position as a public figure.
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1. Courts Should Not Treat a Journalist's Ability to Disseminate
Information as a Position of Power Supporting "Outrageousness"
A court's conclusion that the "ability to disseminate
information to the public" is a "position of power" circumstance that
gives rise to an IIED claim would undoubtedly chill the journalist's
First Amendment right to disseminate information to the public. The
journalist would think twice about filming anything involving a
suspect if she knew that her job function made her inherently more
"outrageous" than the private individual. From the start of each
workday, the journalist would be more likely to incur IIED liability
than the private individual. This is because the journalist has a
greater ability to disseminate free speech than the private individual,
which arguably makes the journalist more powerful and more likely to
be outrageous. It would mean that, even if the journalist acted
reasonably, her actions would still be considered outrageous because
she has the power to disseminate information to the public.
Under this view, courts may restrain the actions of prominent
journalists more than lesser-known journalists, as prominent
journalists have a greater ability to disseminate information to the
public. For example, a journalist for 60 Minutes, covering some of the
most important news stories, would be exposed to greater IIED
liability than a local journalist simply because the 60 Minutes
journalist can exercise her First Amendment rights before a larger
audience. This gives her more power, which means a court could more
easily label her conduct outrageous.
Additionally, the notion that courts would find that someone
has a greater likelihood of liability because that person possesses a
right guaranteed by the Constitution is antithetical to tort law. A
widely accepted principle of IIED jurisprudence is that one cannot be
held liable under IIED for exercising a legal right in a permissible
way.246 One such scenario, as Professor Kircher suggests, may occur
where an insurance adjuster informs a widow that she cannot collect
on the benefits of her late husband's life insurance, on which she is
depending, because the insurer possesses a legally robust policy
defense.247 If a person exercising a legal right in a permissible way
does not incur IIED liability, it logically follows that the person should
not be liable for merely holding such a right ex ante. Just as the
insurance adjuster's ability to inform the widow should not be a
circumstance that gives rise to IIED liability, the journalist's First
Amendment entitlements should not give rise to 1IED liability.
246. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. g (1965).
247. Kircher, supra note 182, at 800.
156 [Vol. 15:1:117
TO CATCH A LAWSUIT
2. Outrageousness: Filming vs. Manner of Filming
Although courts should not consider the mere ability to
disseminate information to the public in assessing outrageousness,
they should consider the manner of the dissemination (i.e., filming).
In other words, a suspect's apprehension that a passive journalist who
is filming in public has the right to broadcast the recording of the
suspect should not increase the journalist's culpability under IIED,
but, if the journalist acts in an outrageous manner while filming, she
may be subject to liability. For instance, in the example above, if the
insurance adjuster goes further than simply informing the widow, and
instead excoriates the widow, he may be liable for IIED damages
because of the manner in which he abused his position of power.
Thus, when NBC cameramen descend upon a shocked suspect in
TCAP at the culmination of a heated confrontation by Hansen, the
suspect's apprehension that NBC has the ability to disseminate
information to the public should be immaterial to outrageousness, but
the aggressive manner of the filming should be considered.2 48
Although society is less sympathetic to suspected predators than to
helpless widows, suspected predators should be entitled to the same
protections from outrageousness.
Judges and juries may have some difficulty excluding the
ability to disseminate information to the public from their evaluation
of a journalist's outrageousness, but it is a necessary exclusion since
First Amendment entitlement should not increase liability. One way
for judges and juries to consider the concept is by imagining the
suspect has no apprehension that the journalist is in fact a journalist,
as opposed to a private individual. Alternatively, judges and juries
can assume that the suspect believes that the cameras are off and not
recording. While this conceptualization is no simple task for a judge
or a jury, it may be an effective way for judges and juries to analyze
behavior for outrageousness without allowing a journalist's First
Amendment entitlements to seep into the equation and increase
liability.
By distinguishing between the suspect's awareness of the
journalist's ability to disseminate information and the journalist's
manner of filming, courts will be able to protect the journalist's First
Amendment free speech right to broadcast, while condemning and
remedying any extra-constitutional conduct that may be outrageous
on the part of the journalist. The ex ante ability to disseminate
248. Professor Adler refers to the moment in TCAP when "a swarm of cameramen
surround the predator, pointing their cameras at him" as "the money shot." See Adler, supra note
8, at 539 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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information and the actual dissemination itself are inextricably
linked, as the ex ante ability facilitates the actual dissemination. By
chilling the ability to disseminate information, courts would
invariably infringe upon the actual dissemination. Attaching liability
to a right to disseminate is akin to prior restraint and will take the
teeth out of the First Amendment's protection of the broadcast.
But courts should evaluate the manner of the filming to protect
individuals from IIED. The manner can be "outrageous," for instance,
if it is intended to sensationalize the unfolding of events before the
lens with an obvious risk of emotional distress to the plaintiff. When
a phalanx of cameramen surprises a suspect in an alarming manner, a
judge or jury can assess the conduct without reference to the
concomitant ability to disseminate the broadcast. Indeed, in such a
situation, the aggressive cameramen become part of the sensational
story, and they do so in a way that is unnecessary to the ultimate
dissemination of information. Courts should consider such conduct
when determining IIED.
IV. CONCLUSION
As investigative journalism increases in popularity and
profitability, investigative journalists must be careful not to abuse
their unique positions of power. When a journalist abuses the public's
trust, the public can unsubscribe from the publication. But when an
investigative journalist violates an individual's rights, the violations
may in fact increase subscriptions and viewership in step with the
increased sensationalism. Courts are responsible for protecting
individuals' rights. To do so, they must establish clearer standards so
that journalists know when they might violate a suspect's rights.
The media influence test provides a simple guideline for
journalists and juries to follow. And the test will increase protections
afforded to suspects because journalists will know whether and when
they will incur liability. But journalists need protection as well.
Courts need to ensure that IIED claims do not chill the investigative
journalist's First Amendment right to disseminate information. Thus,
courts must be sure to exclude the journalist's power to disseminate
information from the journalist's "outrageousness" analysis. It is not
outrageous to be a journalist-journalism is vital to a successful
democracy. Investigative journalists have long performed an
important function in our society, and it is the responsibility of the
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courts to establish clear constitutional standards to balance the rights
at stake for the journalist and the suspect.
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